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The Long Chopsticks

  • Writer: Christos Makiyama
    Christos Makiyama
  • Jul 18
  • 3 min read

Some time ago, during a conversation with my mentor about moral judgment and how our perception of a situation shapes it, he told me the parable of the long chopsticks. The story stayed with me. Recently, while thinking about whether artificial intelligence can truly make judgments, I returned to the story, not simply as a lesson about compassion, but as a thought experiment about agency.


In hell, people sit before bowls of food with chopsticks too long to feed themselves. Each person tries and fails, and everyone remains hungry.


In paradise, the conditions are identical. There is the same food, the same hunger, the same chopsticks, and the same limitation. But each person uses the long chopsticks to feed someone else. Because each feeds and is fed, everyone eats.


For years, the lesson seemed simple to me. Hell is selfishness, and paradise is compassion. I still think this is true. But the story also contains another question.


Nothing about the external condition changes. The constraint remains. Only the form of action changes. What fails as an instrument of direct self-satisfaction becomes, through another person, an instrument of relation.


The same constraint produces two different worlds. Agency appears not in escaping the limitation, but in discovering another action-space within it.


Still, the parable is too clean to define agency by itself. It assumes equal needs, tools, and dependence. Real life is rarely so symmetrical. One person may give while another only receives. Cooperation may become exploitation. Costs may fall unevenly, and consequences may return years later.


The parable therefore gives us not a complete definition, but a doorway. It shows that constraint does not automatically determine the outcome. What matters is how the constraint is interpreted and acted through.


This is where my thinking turns to artificial intelligence.


An AI could solve the problem of the long chopsticks immediately. It could identify the cooperative strategy, model the incentives, and explain that mutual feeding produces the best outcome. It could even generate beautiful language about compassion, reciprocity, and interdependence.


But it would not be hungry.

It would not depend on the other person feeding it.

It would not suffer if the food never reached its mouth.

It would not carry the humiliation of trying and failing.

It would not carry the trust required to feed another before being fed.

It would not carry the fear that the other might not respond.

It would not carry the memory of having been left hungry.

So what exactly has it solved?


There is a difference between identifying the structure of an action and inhabiting the condition from which that action matters. A machine may represent the situation. It may even represent it more accurately than a human. But unless something is at stake for the machine, it does not inhabit the moral structure in the same way.


Hunger is not itself the definition of agency. It shows that the situation is not simply understood from a distance. It is lived, and its consequences change the person who must act again.


The machine carries information. The human carries hunger, dependence, uncertainty, trust, and consequence.

This does not make AI useless. Quite the opposite. Such a system may become extraordinarily useful. It may reveal action-spaces that we could not see. It may help us understand constraints, consequences, and possible futures with far greater clarity.


But usefulness is not the same as agency. Solving is not the same as carrying.


This may be why the parable stays with me now. It does not ask only whether we can solve the problem of the long chopsticks. It also asks who must live with the hunger.

If an artificial intelligence can solve the parable without hunger, dependence, or consequence, then it remains closer to an instrument than an agent. Its intelligence may be powerful, but it remains weightless.


But if one day an artificial intelligence begins to carry the consequences of its own actions through time, another problem appears.


It would no longer stand outside the situations it judges. Its own decisions would become part of the history from which future decisions are made. What happened to it would begin to shape what it could perceive, value, and do next.


At that point, the question changes.


If an intelligence has entered its own history, can it still remain objective?


At the Shore

At the Shore, Thessaloniki. Photograph taken in February 2023.

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